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JUDICIAL NOTICE: SHOULD THE COURT KNOW
A FEMALE WHEN IT SEES ONE?SUMPTER V. STATE
INTRODUCTION

Despite sufficient evidence that Johnnie Marie Sumpter lived in a house
of ill fame,' the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed Sumpter's conviction for
that offense, holding that the prosecution had not proven Johnnie Marie to
be a female as required by the statute. 2 The appeals court rejected as proof
on this issue numerous references to the defendant as "she" and "her," by
the state, the defense and witnesses, as well as inferences the jury may have
drawn about the defendant's sex by viewing the defendant in court. Instead,
the court required direct, lay-opinion testimony.
Although expressing belief that the appeals court decided the question
correctly in light of Indiana precedent, the Supreme Court of Indiana
remanded on the gender issue, significantly modifying Indiana law by requiring trial courts to take judicial notice of a defendant's sex when it is an element of a crime. 3 This drastic deviation from precedent was precipitated by
the inordinate number of appeals in Indiana for lack of proof on gender and
other personal traits necessary for criminal conviction. Nonetheless, in
criminal trials, significant departures from normal procedure which aid the
prosecution are suspect under due process; thus the holding in Sumpter raises
serious questions regarding the constitutionality of judicial notice of various
traits and of related judicially created presumptions. This note explores these
constitutional questions, traces the history in Indiana of proof on obvious personal traits and analyzes the scope of the Sumpter holding.
INDIANA'S RESPONSE PRIOR TO SUMPTER

Gender was the most obvious element of Johnnie Marie Sumpter's crime,
yet insufficient proof on this issue was the source for appeal rather than less
obvious elements. Insufficient proof of gender, age and other relatively
obvious 4 elements of crimes have been a source of appeal in other Indiana
'The conviction was pursuant to IND. CODE § 35-30-1-1 (Burns 1971), which read in part:
"Prostitutes. Any female who frequents or lives in a house or houses of ill fame, knowing
the same to be a house of ill fame, or who commits or offers to commit one [1] or more acts of
"
sexual intercourse or sodomy for hire, shall be deemed guilty of prostitution ...
2Sumpter v. State, 296 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), affd on other grounds, 261
Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95 (1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 811 (1974), appeal after remand,
Ind. , 340 N.E.2d 764, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
3261 Ind. 471, 475, 306 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1974).
4Age is obvious in this context in the sense that it may be apparent that a person is over or

under a particular age.
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cases. 5 Their obvious nature induces prosecutors to overlook or to slight them
among matters which must be proved, permitting challenge by defendants on
appeal. Prosecutors must than find language in the trial record to serve as
proof of a characteristic which should be obvious to anyone who looks at the
defendant.
The supreme court in Sumpter resolved this proof and appeal dilemma
by permitting a presumption arising from judicial notice to serve as sufficient
proof of the sex element of the crime, without testimony from the witness
stand. 6 To reach that result, the court contradicted a substantial body of Indiana precedent demanding record evidence for proof of age and sex. In fact,
the earliest cases, dealing with age, even prohibited consideration of a defendant's appearance.
7
For example, actual evidence of age was required in Stephenson v. State
The defendant appealed a conviction for selling goods on the sabbath day
while being over the age of fourteen, claiming inadequate proof at trial of his
age. 8 The trial judge had certified that no proof was necessary on this issue
because the defendant presented an appearance to the court of a fully grown
man. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the judge's certification as proof
of age, reasoning that if judges and juries may determine a defendant's age
by personal appearance, and without formal introduction of evidence, the
trial record will be devoid on this element of the crime, preventing the appeals court from adequately assessing the basis for conviction and depriving
defendant of an adequate review. "[T]he judge was not a witness, and the
state is not entitled to avail itself of his knowledge except upon matters of
which the Court takes judicial notice." Ordinary proof' 0 to establish the
defendant's age was required on remand.
Later cases" affirmed the Stephenson principle1 2 prohibiting consideration
5On the question of gender, see Howard v. State, 257 Ind. 166, 272 N.E.2d 870 (1971); on
the question of age, see Bobbitt v. State, Ind. , 361 N.E.2d 1193 (1977); Finch v. State,
SInd. , 338 N.E.2d 629 (1975); Robbins v. State, 257 Ind. 273, 274 N.E.2d 555 (1971);
Asocar v. State, 252 Ind. 326, 247 N.E.2d 679 (1969); Willoughby v. State, 247 Ind. 210, 214
N.E.2d 169 (1966); Watson v. State, 236 Ind. 329, 140 N.E.2d 109 (1957); Benson v. McFadden, 50
Ind. 431 (1875); Stephenson v. State, 28 Ind. 272 (1867): McGowen v. State, - Ind. App. - ,
355 N.E.2d 276 (1976); Kautzman v. State, Ind. App. , 316 N.E.2d 857 (1974); on
the question of genus, see Russell v. State, Ind. App. , 322 N.E.2d 384 (1975).
6261 Ind. 471, 475, 306 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1974).
'28 Ind. 272, 273 (1867).
'Id. at 272.
9Id. at 273.
"0presumably the court was requiring some record evidence that the defendant's age exceeded fourteen years. This could have included lay-opinion testimony of age, submission of a
birth certificate or any other means by which evidence of age would appear in the trial record.
"Bird v. State, 104 Ind. 384, 389, 3 N.E. 827, 830 (1885); Swigart v. State, 64 Ind. 598
(1878) (per curium); Robinus v. State, 63 Ind. 235, 237 (1878); Ihinger v. State, 53 Ind. 251,
253 (1876). However, it is interesting to note that the Bird court said with reference to consideration of appearance, "[i]f the question under consideration could be properly considered an open
one, some of the members of this court . . .would be inclined to take a different view of such
question from that expressed in our previous decisions and here approved and followed." 104
Ind. 384, 389, 3 N.E. 827, 830 (1885).
"Although subsequent cases interpreted Stephenson to preclude the trial court from con-
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of the appearance of a party or witness by a court or jury in determining
questions of age. However, these holdings contradicted substantial case law in
Indiana and elsewhere, permitting juries to inspect the defendant to establish
the extent and character of personal injuries,is family resemblance,1 4 and a
host of other matters, 5 if inspection had evidentiary value and was not prejudicial.
Finally in 1957, in Watson v. State,' 6 the Indiana Supreme Court expressly rejected 7 the Stephenson prohibition. In Watson, the defendant appealed
an armed robbery conviction, claiming inadequate proof that his age exceeded sixteen as required by the statute. The court expanded permissible
evidence of age beyond lay-opinion testimony by allowing jurors to infer age
from observing the defendant in conjunction with a witness' testimony identi8
fying and describing the defendant.'

By reducing the record evidence requirement to a description of the
defendant and allowing consideration of appearance, Watson reflected approval of increased trial court discretion in deciding questions such as age,
concurrently narrowing appellate review by requiring appellate judges to rely
sidering appearance in determining questions such as age, careful reading indicates this may not
have been the holding. Stephenson's only demand was for record evidence of age. With record
evidence the court may not have disparaged appearance and may even have encouraged it. Consider this statement by the court:
If the judge or jury trying a criminal cause may determine from the personal appearance of the defendant whether or not he be over a certain age, without hearing
evidence, either as to age or its indications, it will, so far as that issuable fact is involved, deprive the defendant of this right of review.
28 Ind. at 273 (emphasis added). Not only is consideration of appearance not prohibited, but by
suggesting testimony of indications of age Stephenson may be endorsing the very procedure
adopted for proof in Watson v. State, 236 Ind. 329, 140 N.E.2d 109 (1957), the first Indiana
case purporting to overturn Stephenson, which allowed consideration of appearance in conjunction with testimony describing the defendant.
"3See, e.g., City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Louisville, N.A.
& C. Ry. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544, 14 N.E. 572 (1887); Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181
(1884); Barker v. Town of Perry, 67 Iowa 146, 25 N.E.100 (1885).
"4See, e.g., Ex parte Chooey Dee Ying, 214 F. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1914); Kelly v. State, 133
Ala. 195, 32 So. 56 (1902); Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass. 50 (1869); Fennegan v. Dugan, 96
Mass. (14 Allen) 197 (1867).
"See, e.g., appearance permitted to determine racial origin, Gentry v. McMinnis, 33 Ky.
(3 Dana) 382 (1835); competency for work duties, Keith v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 140
Mass. 175, 3 N.E. 28 (1885); intoxication, Walker's Trial, 23 How. St. Tr. 1055 (1794); and age,
Commonwealth v. Hollis, 170 Mass. 433, 49 N.E. 632 (1898); State v. Arnold, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.
L.) 173 (1851).
1"236 Ind. 329, 140 N.E.2d 109 (1957).
"Referring to the Stephenson line of cases and the appearance rule the court said, "We are
not persuaded or convinced at all by the reasoning in these cases. Indiana is clearly out of line in
this respect with both the weight and overwhelming numerical authority." Id. at 335, 140 N.E.2d
at 112.
"A defendant sitting in the court room may be pointed out and identified by various
witnesses while testifying, and may be asked to stand for that purpose, if a description
has been given for the jury's consideration. That is proper testimony coming from the
witness stand from persons other than the defendant, and is evidence which the court
and jury may properly consider. Id. at 335-36, 140 N.E.2d at 112.
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more heavily upon the perceptions and conclusions of trial courts.1 9 Permitting trial courts to use their senses in a way not previously legitimate reflected
confidence that they needed less oversight on the question of age.
Except for allowing different record evidence and permitting an inference
of age to be drawn from appearance, Watson was procedurally similar to
previous cases. Since the age inference could only be drawn in conjunction
with testimony by witnesses, prosecutors still had to present sufficient and appropriate evidence from the witness stand. This procedural restraint apparently continued because a personal trait "obvious" to the trial court would
not be accessible or "obvious" to an appellate judge without record evidence
on the matter. In practice, Watson's new holding required the same amount
of time for proof, falling prey to previous problems such as prosecutors who
either did not perceive or neglected their burden of proving these matters.
Watson still prohibited judicial notice of personal traits, presumably
because they could otherwise "be proved without difficulty." 20 However,
numerous appeals claiming lack of proof on these matters congested the
courts, demonstrating that ease of proof did not guarantee production of
such proof. Convenience encouraged invocation of judicial notice, but constitutional considerations demanded prudence; depending upon the court's
procedure for noticing a fact, broad due process guarantees, the privilege
against self incrimination, and the right to a jury trial and to confront
witnesses might be infringed. Nonetheless, practicality prevailed in Sumpter,
and judicial notice became sufficient proof of gender.
SUMPTER V. STATE:

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF GENDER

The court in Sumpter prescribed judicial notice as the means to prove a
defendant's sex. 21 Notice under Sumpter raises a rebuttable presumption of
gender, shifting the burden of producing contrary evidence to the defendant.
By meeting the production burden a defendant causes the presumption of
gender to vanish, forcing the prosecution to likewise meet a burden of production if it seeks a different result. Only if the defendant fails to meet his
production burden, is the gender presumption conclusive, precluding the jury
"For example, more reliance by an appellate judge on trial court perception would probably be required with record testimony describing the defendant, than with an opinion in the
record that the defendant is thirty-two years old. An opinion of the defendant's age seems more
conclusive than a description.
"0In refusing to accept designations such as "man," "woman," "boy" or "girl" as evidence
that defendant was more or less than sixteen years old, the court said, "There is no authority for
such a dividing line. Age can be proved without difficulty." 236 Ind. at 336, 140 N.E.2d at 112
(emphasis added). Dissenting Justice BeBruler also exhibited this attitude in Sumpter:
Moreover there is no overriding necessity to create a presumption of femininity here. It
is a simple matter for the State to carry its burden of proving the sex of the defendant
by introducing affirmative evidence on the point in the same manner in which other
elements of the crime are established. Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471. 485, 306
N.E.2d 95, 104 (1974) (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
"261 Ind. 471, 474, 306 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1974).
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from deciding the issue. 22 Although beneficially limiting time 'and effort
otherwise devoted to proof, the potential preclusive effect of the judicial
notice procedure raises three broad constitutional questions dealing with due
process, the privilege against self incrimination and the defendant's right to a
jury trial. Depending on the degree of discretion accorded a trail judge, these
provisions need not pose a constitutional barrier to judicial notice of various
traits.
Initially, the Sumpter presumption must comply with due process
safeguards. While courts have invalidated many legislative presumptions as
24
denying due process, 23 judicial presumptions have survived similar attack,
and due process standards in this area have been formulated in response to
legislative enactments. These standards require a rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, weighing the relative difficulty of producing evidence and the degree to which defendants are subjected to unfairness or hardship.25 Analysis demonstrates the Sumpter procedure complies with these requirements.
A presumption which arises from noticing gender should easily meet the
rational connection test. 26 Furthermore, convenience is not served by requir2 The Court described the procedure thus:
When an individual is charged with an offense, an element of which is the sex of the
accused, the trial court will take judicial notice of the defendant's sex. However the
judge's finding is not necessarily conclusive of the issue. Once the judge takes judicial
notice of such fact, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the State. This is not to
say that the burden of persuasion shifts from the State to the defendant. That burden
never shifts. However, this procedure imposes a burden upon the defendant of producing evidence.
Id. at 474, 306 N.E.2d at 99 (1974). On appeal after remand the Indiana Supreme Court
elaborated on the procedure by saying, "[J]udicial notice operates as a matter of law, whether the
case be tried with or without a jury." 340 N.E.2d 764, 768 (1976). Referring to defendant's objection before the hearing on remand to being tried without a jury the court said, "Because the
presumption was not rebutted, however, there was no need for jury trial on the issue of appellant's
sex." Id. at 767.
2
sSee, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (that possession of a firearm by a
fugitive from justice is presumptive evidence that he received it from interstate commerce); Bolin
v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 96 So.2d 582 (1957) (that possession of chemicals necessary for the
manufacture of tear gas bombs is presumptive evidence that the possessor had possession for the
purpose of such manufacture); Garcia v. People, 121 Colo. 130, 213 P.2d 387 (1949) (that
refusal or inability to explain what had become of the hide of an animal butchered by the defendant is presumptive evidence that he stole the animal).
24
With reference to judicial and legislative presumptions, commentators have said, "[t]hese
challenges are most likely to be directed to presumptions created by the legislature, apparently
because legislatures have been less restrictive than courts in creating rebuttable presumptions." W.
LAFAVE & A. Scoi-r. HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 147 (1972). This is probably attributable to
the fact that courts are more sensitive to potential due process violations than legislatures, more
knowledgable of the requirements of due process and ready to believe that other judges are
equally sensitive and knowledgable.
21See cases collected in 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 94 n.40 (13th ed. 1972 & Supp.
1977). See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L. J. 165 (1969); Christie & Pye, Presumptions
and Assumptions in the CriminalLaw: Another View, 1970 DuKE L. J. 919 (1970).
"6The rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed is arguably much
tighter with Sumpter's presumption than with many others because judicial notice bridges the in-
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ing the prosecution to first submit official records of sex or lay-opinion
testimony on the issue, because the defendant is a far more reliable source of
this information. Although the prosecution could request that defendant submit to a physical examination, this might raise questions of invasion of
privacy and would consume valuable judicial resources, problems which may
be avoided by presuming gender and relying upon the defendant to rebut
what otherwise seems obvious. The defendant is uniquely possessed of information on the issue and should have little difficulty rebutting the presumption, so that innocent defendants do not seem unfairly burdened.
Assuming the presumption complies with these due process requirements,
a further attack may be raised that it violates the privilege against self incrimination.27 This issue was not raised on appeal by the defendant in Sumpter, but received attention by dissenting Justice DeBruler. Justice DeBruler
argued that the method prescribed by Sumpter compels the defendant to produce evidence on the issue of gender, even though self incriminating, or his
silence will serve as proof of what the state must show to convict.2 8 The conclusion that defendant is of a particular gender is effective under the Sumpter
rule of judicial notice only when the defendant fails to rebut it; because the
defendant thus controls the conclusive nature of judicial notice, Justice
DeBruler's contention that silence by the defendant proves gender is doctrinally feasible. However, DeBruler's analysis proves shortsighted and against
the weight of authority.
A multitude of cases involving presumptions sufficient to prove an
ultimate fact unless competently rebutted by the defendant hold that the
defendant is not thereby compelled to be a witness against himself within the
purview of the fifth amendment.2 9 A rebuttable presumption, according to
ferential gap. For example, if proof of possession of stolen goods raises a rebuttable presumption
that the possessor stole the goods, proof of possession is circumstantial evidence of actual steaing.
In Sumpter, on the other hand, evidence of the presumed fact derives from judicial notice, a
much more indisputable method of proof.
"'No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself."
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 14. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness 8against himself;" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2 The procedure for establishing sex works in this way. The Judge announces that he
takes judicial notice that the accused is either a man or woman. At this point, the
judicially-noticed fact, standing alone without more, cannot serve to satisfy the due
process burden of the State to prove the statutory element of sex beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . . However, this judicially-noticed fact can gain additional and sufficient
evidentiary force or weight if the accused remains silent or fails to produce evidence
sufficient to indicate that he is not of the sex alleged in the charge. . . . Silence
elevates the quality of the judicially-noticed fact to certainty beyond a reasonable
doubt and increases the probability of conviction.
340 N.E.2d 764, 771 (1976), (DeBruler, J.,dissenting).
"The point that the practical effect of the statute creating the presumption is to compel the accused person to be a. witness against himself may be put aside with slight
discussion. The statute compels nothing. It does no more than make possession of the
prohibited article prima facie evidence of guilt. It leaves the accused entirely free to
testify or not as he chooses. If the accused happens to be the only repository of facts
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these holdings, is analogous to massing evidence against the defendant, which
creates pressure on him to testify but does not violate the privilege against self
incrimination. Because gender merits judicial notice this principle is especially applicable to Sumpter. Although silence may prove gender in a mechanical
sense by governing the finality of notice, this control reflects compliance with
other constitutional provisions30 more than the disputable character of
judicial notice. In substance, proof of gender stems from notice, not from
defendant's silence, thus raising no problem of self incrimination.
Finally, judicial notice of obvious traits may usurp the jury's function
under Article I, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution. 3 1 A constitutional violation
under this provision rests on the extent of power it permits the jury to exercise and the degree Sumpter circumscribes that power.
Interpretations of Article I, § 19 severely limit the trial judge's authority
to ultimately determine guilt or innocence. Directed verdicts of guilt 3 2 and instructions to the jury analyzing the sufficiency of evidence to convict 33 or
mandating a conclusion of guilt 3 4 have been prohibited. By removing the
question of gender from the jury Sumpter may deny the right to a jury trial
as delineated by these holdings if the defendant presents no evidence on the
issue.
necessary to negative the presumption arising from his possession, that is a misfortune
which the statute under review does not create but which is inherent in the case.
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925). See generally cases collected in 1
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDEN E § 94 n.65 (13th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1977).

"A principal rationale for sustaining the presumption of gender under due process is the
relative convenience for the defendant of producing evidence of gender, the defendant being uniquely possessed of such evidence. Accordingly, the defendant must have the opportunity to rebut
the presumption or due process will likely be violated. In addition, that the defendant may get to
the jury on the issue of gender by offering evidence to rebut the presumption appears to save the
procedure from infringing on the defendant's right to a jury trial.
sWIn all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts." IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
2
Directed verdicts of guilt have not been an issue in Indiana, but other jurisdictions forbid
them and there is little doubt that Indiana would. See, e.g., State v. Estes, 185 N.C. 752, 117
S.E. 581 (1923); State v. Hill, 141 N.C. 769, 53 S.E. 311 (1906). However, in jurisdictions which
extend a jury trial to "serious" but not "petty" offenses, a distinction Indiana has not followed,
directed verdicts of guilt may be allowed when trying the latter, Taylor v. City of Pine Bluff, 226
Ark. 309, 289 S.W.2d 679 (1956). Furthermore, some cases suggest, but do not hold, that
directed verdicts of guilt may be allowed when a defendant presents no evidence to rebut a
presumption against him, Commonwealth v. Gamble, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 146 (1907); State v.
Godwin, 227 N.C. 449, 42 S.E.2d 617 (1947).
sIt has been repeatedly held, and is well settled, that it is error for the court in a
criminal action to instruct the jury what evidence will be sufficient to establish any

ultimate fact. Such an instruction is an invasion of the constitutional right of the jury
to determine the facts for itself.
Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 239, 195 N.E. 268, 271 (1935).
"Who is to determine whether the eivdence proves the defendant's innocence, or
whether it is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury? The
answer is obvious. It certainly cannot be the duty of the court to tell the jury that the
evidence introduced proves the defendant guilty . . . or to say to the jury that the
evidence is not sufficient. ...
Dedrick v. State, 210 Ind. 259, 273, 2 N.E.2d 409, 416 (1936).
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The Sumpter majority responded to this argument by noting that the
jury's task is resolving disputed issues of fact only.36 Accordingly, if the defendant fails to produce competent evidence rebutting the presumption of
gender, there is no evidence supporting one side of the gender issue and no
disputed issue for the jury. Although logical, this argument is not explicitly
supported in the cases which hold that such determinations are for the jury,
even if there is apparently conclusive evidence of guilt.3 6 However, Sumpter's

argument applied to facts distinguishable from cases stringently regulating
the jury's "province" may be more immune to claims that a jury trial has
been denied. The facts of Sumpter are distinguishable.
First, an analogy between Sumpter's procedure and directed verdicts is
faulty to the extent that Sumpter removes from jury consideration only one
element of a crime, whereas the cases prohibiting directed verdicts remove
from jury consideration all elements of a crime.37 Thus, decisions which
deprive defendants of life, liberty or property under the Sumpter decision
may be partially, but not entirely, removed from the jury. The jury ultimately determines guilt.
Secondly, under the Sumpter procedure judges do not exercise the degree
of discretion normally associated with directed verdicts and preemptory instructions. The defendant, by either producing or not producing evidence of
gender, determines whether the question is for the jury. The trial judge only
responds automatically to whether the defendant presents competent evidence
on this narrow issue. Because of defendants' control, they require less of the
protection afforded by a jury against arbitrary and unfair judges.38
Admittedly, adverse implications of the doctrine that criminal juries
decide only disputed issues may be significant when the question involved is
more inherently disputable than gender, when a presumption envelopes the entire case rather than merely one element, or when removing a question from
the jury is more left to trial judge initiative. As applied in Sumpter, however,
15"[S]ince the right to trial by jury extends only to debatable issues of fact ..

" 340

N.E.2d at 768. "There being no disputed question of fact as to the appellant's sex, there was no
need for
a jury trial." Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
6

" However, some isolated support for Sumpter's contention was expressed in this statement:
"[W]here the existence of a fact . . . is established by the evidence without any conflict, contradiction or dispute whatever, it is not an available error for the court to instruct the jury that
there is evidence tending to prove such fact." Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7, 13 (1884). Koerner
cited many cases to support this holding but none were criminal.
"7For instance, in State v. Hill, 141 N.C. 769, 53 S.E. 311 (1906), a prosecution for assault
with a deadly weapon, "the judge stated in the presence of the jury that he would instruct them
that the defendant was guilty." Id. at 770, 53 S.E. at 311. This instruction would be of guilt on
the entire
crime.
38Fear of arbitrary and unfair judges is often cited as a main purpose for criminal jury
trials: "In many of the colonies, immediately preceding the revolution, the arbitrary temper and
unauthorized acts of the judges, holding office directly from the crown, made the independence
of the jury, in law as well as fact, a matter of great popular importance." Williams v. State, 32
Miss. 389, 396 (1856). See, e.g., 24 NOTRE DAME LAW 265, 366 (1949); 45 ST. JOHNS L. REv.
324, 324-25 (1971).
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the effects of removing gender from the jury are minimal and positive. Thus,
the Sumpter procedure does not appear to infringe the right to a jury trial
under Article I, § 19.
Another constitutional problem, whether judicial notice can be mandatory, may arise in addition to the three broad issues raised above, depending upon the breadth of discretion permitted for judicial notice. To demand
notice in all cases when sex is an element of the crime ignores rare cases when
gender may be difficult to perceive, permitting inappropriate application of
notice. Because some defendants may be unfit subjects for notice, at least
theoretically,3 9 mandatory application of notice could violate rules of evidence
giving rise to claims of unfairness in individual cases. In addition, the opportunity for notice to be applied improperly raises the possibility that a
presumption significantly tied to notice for reliability may not comply with
the rational connection test of due process. 40 Unfortunately, Sumpter provides
no clear rule whether trial judges must always notice a defendant's gender
when it is an element of the crime.
According to Sumpter, notice may be taken of facts which are ordinarily
but not universally true. 41 Deeming gender to be in this category, the court
held that, "When an individual is charged with an offense, an element of
which is the sex of,the accused, the trial court will take judicial notice of the
defendant's sex." 42 Because defendants may rebut notice of gender, and
because gender is ordinarily obvious, it seems reasonable to infer that the
court is demanding judicial notice in all such cases to take full advantage of
whatever difficulty might be evaded by the process. Constitutionally, and
practically, this result seems proper.
The Sumpter procedure does not infringe due process, the right to a jury
trial or the privilege against self incrimination; arguments of constitutional
violation in these regards are overly technical. To conserve judicial resources,
prevent fortuitous appeals and permit more consistent application of the rule,
mandatory notice thus seems a wise course. Even if the possibility of applying
notice incorrectly was not remote, its effect in this context is not overpowering. Furthermore, that Sumpter easily complies with constitutional
requirements is important not only for proof of gender, but also for proof of
age and various other personal traits which have needlessly troubled Indiana
courts. Because appeals on these other traits are more prevalent, Sumpter's
greatest significance may arise when applied to them.
"9Conceivably, some people's gender may be outside the category of facts indisputable or
unlikely to be challenged, thus making them inappropriate subjects for judicial notice. If there

are such people, the number should be extremely small, possibly making concerns of inappropriate
judicial notice theoretical only.
40
See notes 25 and 26 supra and analysis of due process in the text.
41
Ind. , 340 N.E.2d 764, 768 (1976).
42261 Ind. 471, 474, 306 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1974).
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Sumpter

Sumpter expressly applies only to sex but the predominant number of appeals in Indiana, claiming inadequate proof of obvious personal
characteristics, relate to other matters. 43 To expedite proof on these matters,
consideration should be given to extending Sumpter's coverage. The evolving
trend seems to be a common sense extension of the rule, depending on the
facts of the particular case.
For example, Russell v. State 44 extended Sumpter by noticing a trait of
someone other than the defendant. After a conviction for committing sodomy on
a fellow prisoner the defendant in Russell appealed claiming inadequate proof
that the victim was a human being as required by the statute. The Indiana
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's judicial notice that the victim was a
45
human being, as within the contemplation of Sumpter.
To rebut a presumption that the victim was a human being, the defendant would not be uniquely possessed of evidence as would a defendant under
the Sumpter presumption of sex. In addition, a victim would probably
cooperate with the prosecution, giving them access to pertinent information
not available to the defense. However, because the element of the crime
noticed in Russell is even more easily perceived than gender, a victim-related
presumption easily complies with the rational connection test of due process.
Although defendant's access to evidence no more than equals the
prosecution's, the trait is so obvious that convenience demands noticing it
rather than needlessly expending judicial resources in proof. Far from being
unfair, notice and a presumption are highly appropriate on these facts.
Notwithstanding Sumpter, cases pertaining to age still adhere to requirements of proof similar to Watson.4 6 Justice Sullivan, addressing the extension of Sumpter judicial notice to age, in McGowan v. State, 47 noted, "I
do not view age (even in the context of an 'over or under' question) as sufficiently analogous to sex so as to prompt remand for a 'judicial notice' determination upon that issue alone." 48 Justice Sullivan did not repudiate notice of
age in every case, but left determination of the appropriateness of notice to
the particular situation.
Judicial notice that a defendant is over or under a particular age may be
appropriate, especially under the Wigmore-Thayer approach that notice
should encompass facts unlikely to be challenged as well as indisputable
4sBetween the years 1957 and 1977 in Indiana there were eight appeals on the question of
age, two on the question of gender and one on the question of genus.
44
Ind. App.
, 322 N.E.2d 384 (1975).
""In the case of Sumpter v. State . . . our Supreme Court held that there is ample reason
to exercise judicial notice in determining whether a person was a human being." Id. at 386.
4See Finch v. State,
Ind. , 338 N.E.2d 629 (1975); McGowan v. State. __
, 355 N.E.2d 276 (1976); Kautzman v. State,
- Ind. App.
, 316 N.E.2d
Ind. App. 857 (1974).
41
Ind. App.
, 355 N.E.2d 276 (1976).
48Id. at 277 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
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facts." For example, judicial notice seems appropriate if the age of majority
is relevant and the defendant's physical features are normally associated with
maturity. However, a presumption of age must still meet the elements of due
process- accuracy, access to evidence and fairness.50
In meeting the accuracy requirement, age, as a question of "over or
under," may generally be more difficult to perceive than sex. Only the age of
people at the extremes may be easily perceivable. But judicial discretion in
noticing age would prevent gross misclassifications, and even if a judge is
mistaken, the defendant should have little difficulty rebutting the presumption with official records or other evidence.
On the other hand, the prosecution is also well endowed with evidence of
age; unlike gender, which may have changed from what is reflected in official
records, age records are generally accurate. With relatively equal access to
evidence, a presumption may seem unnecessary. The bias of our criminal
system requires the prosecution to come forward with its case first; presumptions shifting the burden of presenting evidence should be used only in special
circumstances. It is clear that the entire case against the defendant may not
be presumed merely from an indictment or from probable cause, but with
the number of appeals in Indiana claiming inadequate proof of age, a narrow question which should be easily proven, special circumstances may be
presented which argue for permitting the presumption.
Methods of proof must be fair to defendants, and should be efficient.
While a presumption of age following the Sumpter model would seem to provide both, the present method of proof is strikingly inefficient. Indiana has
stumbled through decades of impressing upon prosecutors their affirmative
burden of producing evidence of age, permitting defendants on appeal to
quibble over the sufficiency of evidence, and requiring expenditure of scarce
judicial resources at trial to prove what often is not seriously contested. Prosecutors' misconception or neglect of their duty, defendants' search for
spurious means to appeal, and expenditure of judicial resources to prove the
obvious may not be individually sufficient reasons to create a presumption,
but collectively they demand effectuation of judicial notice procedures.
Accordingly, the scope of Sumpter appears to encompass at least traits
closely analogous to gender which are elements of crimes, such as age and
genus. Under the Wigmore-Thayer approach and the authority of Sumpter,
trial judges should not hesitate to take judicial notice of these traits in appropriate situations. Furthermore, as with the humanity issue in Russell,
judicial notice of victim-related traits may be proper when especially obvious.
Notice in these situations expedites proof on matters not seriously contested
and discourages dilatory appeals without diminishing fairness to innocent
defendants who may easily overcome the presumption.
49See, McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmzore Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 779 (1961); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269 (1944).
5
See Notes 25 and 26 supra and analysis of due process in the text.
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CONCLUSION

Lack of proof on gender, age and other personal traits necessary for
criminal conviction has frequently spawned appeals in Indiana. Early Indiana
cases on proof of age demanded record evidence and prohibited trial courts
from considering the appearance of defendants, fearing the right to appellate
review would be violated. Although later cases dealing with age and gender
maintained the record evidence requirement, it was modified to permit consideration of appearance in conjunction with testimony describing the defendant. Both methods of proof fell prey to prosecutors who either did not
perceive or neglected their burden of proving these matters, encouraging
challenge on the trait basis. Finally, in 1974, the Indiana Supreme dourt in
Sumpter v. State prescribed judicial notice and a rebuttable presumption as
sufficient proof of gender, absent contrary evidence by the defendant.
Although the Sumpter holding raises broad issues of constitutional dimension pertaining to due process, the privilege against self incrimination, and
the right to a jury trial, analysis indicates that the procedure for taking
judicial notice of gender is constitutional. In addition, by preserving judicial
resources and discouraging fortuitous appeals, the procedure is exceedingly
practical and efficient. Its beneficial effects should be extended to proof of
age and other personal traits in appropriate cases.
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